Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2005

State of Utah v. Randall K. Johns : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Randall W. Richards; The Public Defender; Association of Weber County; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Johns, No. 20050746 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6000

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 20050746
RANDALL K. JOHNS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM A PLEA OF GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL
TOGETHER WITH THE SUBSEQUENT SENTENCE OF THE
DEFENDANT ON ONE COUNT OF CHILD KIDNAPPING A FIRSTDEGREE FELONY IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A. §76-5-301.1 (1953). IN
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE MICHAEL D.
LYON PRESIDING.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

RANDALL W. RICHARDS (4503)
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER
ASSOCIATION OF WEBER
COUNTY
2550 Washington Boulevard, Ste 300
Ogden, Utah 84401

Telephone: (801)366-0100

Telephone: (801) 399-4191

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School,UTAH
BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FILED
APPELLATF

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 20050746
RANDALL K. JOHNS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM A PLEA OF GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL
TOGETHER WITH THE SUBSEQUENT SENTENCE OF THE
DEFENDANT ON ONE COUNT OF CHILD KIDNAPPING A FIRSTDEGREE FELONY IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A. §76-5-301.1 (1953). IN
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE MICHAEL D. LYON
PRESIDING.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

RANDALL W. RICHARDS (4503)
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER
ASSOCIATION OF WEBER
COUNTY
2550 Washington Boulevard, Ste 300
Ogden, Utah 84401

Telephone: (801) 366-0100

Telephone: (801)399-4191

Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

i, ii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

6

STATEMENT OF FACTS

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

9

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN
VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES
CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS
SEVEN
AND
TWELVE
OF
THE
UTAH
CONSTITUTION WHEN HIS ATTORNEY FAILED
TO MOVE THE COURT TO FIND THAT THE
DEFENDANT WAS INCOMPETENT TO ENTER HIS
PLEA
10

II.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR
IN FAILING TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT RULING
TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS
INCOMPETENT AT THE TIME HE ENTERED HIS
PLEA AND THEREFORE HIS DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS HAD BEEN VIOLATED
16

CONCLUSION
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain
I errors.

10

20
21

ADDENDA:
Addendum A: Sentence, Judgment and Commitment
Addendum B: Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

i

i

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,II
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)

19

Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,172, 95 S.Ct. 896, 904, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975)

19

Kimmelman v. Morrrison, 411 U.S. 365 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305,365,375,
386(1986)
11,12
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668,686,687,104 S.Ct 2052,80 L.Ed.2d 674 , 688,
692,693,694 (1984)
2,10,11,13,14,15,16
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,123 S.Ct. 2527,156 L.Ed.2d 471, (U.S. 2003)...12,13
UTAH STATE CASES
Jacobs v. State, 20 P.3d 382,385 (Utah 2001)

19

Salazarv. Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988(Utah 1993)

18

State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920,923 n. 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)

18

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993)
State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29,36 (Utah 1989)

2,3
16

State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170,174 (Utah Ct.App. 1992)

3

State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973,976 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)

13

State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,1312 (Utah 1987)

19, 20

State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346,350 (Utah Ct. App. 2000)

16

State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, (Utah Ct. App. 1996)

17

State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 94 P.3d 186,191 (Utah 2004)

17

State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332,334 (Utah 1993)

3

State v. Pierce 655 P.2d 676,677 (Utah 1982)

16,18

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, imay contain errors.

State v. Robison 2005 WL 91251 (Utah App.)

17

State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351,359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)

13

State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 675 (Utah App. 1993)

18

State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182,187 (Utah 1990)

2,15

State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233,1236 (Utah 1989)

19

York v. Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590, 594 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)

19

STATUTES AND RULES
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AMENDMENT 4
AMENDMENT 6
AMENDMENT 14

3,13
1, 2,3,10,15
1,3,10

UTAH CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE 1, Section 7

1, 4,10

ARTICLE 1, Section 12

1, 4,10

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§76-5-301.1(1953)
§77-15-1

1,4,5
20

§78-2a-3(2)(c)

1

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Rule 11

5,6,18,19,20

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
ii
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:
CaseNo.20050746-CA

RANDALL KEVIN JOHNS,
Defendant/Appellant.

:
:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a plea of guilty and mentally ill together with the
subsequent sentence of the defendant on one count of Child Kidnapping a firstdegree felony in violation of U.C.A. §76-5-301.1 (1953). The trial court sentenced
the defendant on August 15, 2005. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(c).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT I
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF
THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1,
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION BY HIS ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO MOVE
THE COURT TO FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS
INCOMPETENT TO ENTER HIS PLEA?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a
matter of fact and law whether the defendant was denied his right to effective
assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which was
adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether
counsel was ineffective. The Court held that;
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. at
466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693.

POINT II
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN
FAILING TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT RULING TO THE
EFFECT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS INCOMPETENT
AT THE TIME HE ENTERED HIS PLEA AND THEREFORE
HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS HAD BEEN VIOLATED?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was not properly preserved for
appeal therefore the plain error standard applies. "To establish plain error, a
defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). (See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah
Ct.App. 1992) and State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993)).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
FOURTH AMENDMENT - Search and Seizure
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
SIXTH AMENDMENT - Rights of Accused in Criminal Prosecutions
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - Rights Guaranteed Privileges and
Immunities of Citizenship, Due Process and Equal Protection
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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I

UTAH CONSITITUION
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law.

ARTICLE I, SECTION 12. [RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PERSONS.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend
in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole
or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any
pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery
is allowed as defined by statute or rule, (emphasis added)

<

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
U.C.A.§76-5-301.1. Child Kidnapping
(1) An actor commits child kidnapping if the actor intentionally or knowingly,
without authority of law, and by any means and in any manner, seizes, confines,
detains, or transports a child under the age of 14 without the consent of the victim's
parent or guardian, or the consent of a person acting in loco parentis.
(2) Violation of Section 76-5-303 is not a violation of this section.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(

(3) Child kidnapping is a first-degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an
indeterminate term of not less than 6, 10, or 15 years and which may be for life.
Imprisonment is mandatory in accordance with Section 76-3-406.
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Rule 11(e)- PLEAS(e)The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly
waived the
right
to
counsel
and
does
not
desire
counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and
that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an
admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if
the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be
imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement,
and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(e)(7) the defendant
has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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withdraw the plea; and(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal
is limited. These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the
record or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents
of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will
be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into
or advise
concerning
any
collateral
consequences
of a plea.
(Rule 11 is attached hereto, in its entirety, as Addendum B)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant was charged with Child Kidnapping, a first-degree felony that
carried a minimum mandatory sentence of 6, 10, or 15 to life. The trial court as
well as counsel for both sides had serious concerns about the mental functioning
and abilities of the defendant, and consequently several alienist were appointed to
examine the defendant. The court finally determined that the defendant had
received sufficient counseling to be competent to be sentenced and the Court
sentenced the defendant to an indeterminate sentence of 5 years to life at the Utah
State Prison, (R.83) The judgment and order on sentencing was entered on August
15, 2005 (R. 83). On August 26, 2005, the Defendant filed a notice of appeal.
(R.97).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Defendant was charged with Child Kidnapping, a first-degree felony
that carried a minimum mandatory sentence of 6,10, or 15 to life. Due to some
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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questions as to the Defendant's competency, two alienists were appointed to
evaluate the Defendant, and at a further hearing on July 22, 2004, the trial court
reported that the two evaluations indicated that the Defendant was competent to
stand trial. (R. 113/2)
At a hearing on December 2, 2004, pursuant to a plea agreement, the
Defendant pled guilty and mentally ill to the charge with an agreement that the
State would affirmatively recommend a 6-year minimum at the time of sentencing.
According to the State, at the time of the entry of plea, the Defendant met the
victim while fishing near his home. (R. 114 /5) The victim (a male under the age of
14) asked the Defendant if he could use his cell phone. The Defendant told the
child that he didn't have a phone with him, but he would allow him to use the
phone at his house. The two then went to the house where the Defendant then
pulled out a knife and refused to let the victim leave. At one point the Defendant
stuck the knife in a doorjamb to emphasis the seriousness of the threat. (R. 114/5)
After a relatively short period of time the Defendant went to a different room in the
house and the victim left. The victim was never injured in the encounter. (R.
114/5) The court appointed an additional alienist to reexamine the Defendant for
sentencing purposes.
On January 13, 2005, the court reviewed the new report prior to imposing
sentence. The evaluation, conducted by psychologist Beverly O'Connor suggested
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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that not only was the Defendant mentally ill at the time of the offense, but she
questioned whether or not he was competent at the time of the entry of plea to
understand and properly enter the plea. The court, based on that report, sent the
Defendant to the State Hospital for a 90-day period for an additional evaluation
regarding his mental competency. (R. 115/2-6)
i

At a further hearing held on March 21, 2005, the court reviewed the reports
of Dr. O'Connor as well as Dr. Rick Hawkes and made a finding as follows:
At this point I'm going to make a finding that he does suffer from
a significant mental defect. The he suffers from impairment in his
capacity to reason and consider the consequences and make
judgments. And I think that it's a reasonable extension of that that
he does not also have the ability to consult effectively with his
counsel. (R. 116/5)
The court then continued the case for the prosecutor to determine how he would
proceed in light of this new information.
On April 7, 2005, the matter was again brought before the court and the
parties and the court was again in a dilemma as to how to proceed. Dr. O'Connor
opined that the Defendant was mentally ill and not competent to proceed.(R.
117/7) The concern was since the Defendant was not competent to proceed, the
court could not impose sentence. Further complicating the matter was that the
Defendant would not even be competent to authorize the filing of a motion to
withdraw his plea. (R. 117/6) The court continued the matter for an additional 90
days for treatment at the State Hospital.
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On July 11, 2005, the Defendant was brought back before the court after
receiving treatment at the State Hospital. The report from the hospital apparently
was that the Defendant had received treatment and was competent to proceed with
sentencing. The matter was continued one more time for the preparation of a presentence report.(R. 118/2,3)
The Defendant was sentence on August 15, 2005, to a term at the Utah State
Prison of 5 years to life in prison.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The defendant believes that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
when trial counsel failed to move the court to disallow his plea on the grounds that
it was taken involuntarily.

After the court and counsel received Dr. Beverly

O'Connor's psychological evaluation, it was obvious that the defendant was unable
to voluntarily enter a plea due to the psychological problems that he was
experiencing at the time that the plea was entered. Furthermore the defendant was
mentally retarded to the extent that Dr. O'Connor believed that he was unable to
understand and comprehend the import and consequences of the plea and therefore
could not voluntarily enter a plea. Trial counsel failed to make any motion to
correct the obvious problem.
The defendant further believes that the court plainly erred in not disallowing
the defendant's plea once it had received information that the defendant was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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incompetent to proceed at the time the plea was entered. The doctrine of manifest
injustice should have been applied to the circumstances of the case at bar due to the
fact that the defendant was mentally and emotionally unable to competently enter a
plea. The trial court should have, on a sua sponte motion, thereafter disallowed the
plea and set the case for further proceedings.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, SECTIONS
SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
WHEN HIS ATTORNEY FAILED TO MOVE THE COURT TO
FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS INCOMPETENT TO
ENTER HIS PLEA.

<

<

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to counsel is
the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 686, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court
established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's assistance was
ineffective.

"First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was

deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.
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In making that assessment, the Court in Strickland v. Washington gave some
guidance in noting; "The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." (Id. at 688) Although the
Court in Strickland did not "exhaustively define the obligations of counsel nor
form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance", (Id. at 688) it did
mention certain minimal requirements. These duties include, "the overarching duty
to advocate the defendant's cause" as well as "a duty to bring to bear such skill and
knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process." (Id. at
688) Additionally, the overarching requirement by the Supreme Court in
ineffective assistance of counsel cases includes a "performance inquiry [as to]
whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances."
(Id. at 688)
Several other cases more specifically define when a defense counsels
performance has slipped below the threshold cited above.
In the case of Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365 (1986) the Court was
presented with a case where defense counsel, due to a failure to conduct proper
discovery, did not timely file a motion to suppress evidence under the Fourth
Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction under an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. The Supreme Court affirmed that reversal. In that
affirmation the Court stated:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Where defense counselfs failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment
claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the
defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is
meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict
would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order
to demonstrate actual prejudice. (Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All
U.S. 365, 375 (1986))
In making the determination that trial counsels conduct failed to comport with
constitutional requirements the Court held:
In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct pretrial
discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only implausible
explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while generally
creditable enough, suggests no better explanation for this apparent
and pervasive failure to "make reasonable investigations or to make
a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations
unnecessary." [citation omitted] Under these circumstances,
although the failure of the District Court and the Court of Appeals
to examine counsel's overall performance was inadvisable, we think
this omission did not affect the soundness of the conclusion both
courts reached — that counsel's performance fell below the level of
reasonable professional assistance in the respects alleged.
(Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 386 (1986))

(

In the case of Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d
471, (U.S. 2003) the U.S. Supreme Court found that counsel's failure to investigate
the extensive abuse the defendant had suffered through his life was unreasonable.
The Court reversed his conviction on the grounds that this failure resulted in
defense counsels inability to present this evidence to the sentencing jury in a
capital case. The Court stated:

^

We further find that had the jury been confronted with this
considerable mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable probability
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that it would have returned with a different sentence. (Wiggins v.
Smith at Point III)
The Utah Appellate Courts have adopted the Strickland test and have
likewise rendered decisions in ineffective assistance of counsel cases that can
guide a determination of when a defense attorney fails in his appointed duties.
In the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) the
Court held that the failure of trial counsel to object to a 4th Amendment violation
constituted reversible ineffective assistance of counsel error. In that case, the
Court applied the Strickland test to a situation where defense counsel had in a
pretrial motion moved to suppress evidence on the basis of an illegal search. The
trial court denied that motion based upon evidence at a preliminary hearing. During
trial, the officer altered his testimony establishing the lack of plain view, yet trial
counsel did not re-raise the motion to suppress. The Court held that "where a
defendant can show that there was no conceivable legitimate tactical basis for
counsel's deficient actions, the first prong of Strickland is satisfied." (Id. at 976,
quoting State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
In the present case defense counsel failed to recognize and move the court to
disallow the defendant's plea which was taken when he was clearly incompetent to
enter such a plea. The trial court had previously ordered various psychological tests
on the defendant which came back indicating that the defendant had a diminished
capacity both at the time that the offense was committed as well as at the time of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the entry of plea. The report by Dr. O'Connor clearly indicated that the defendant
had a full scale IQ of 69, which put the defendant in the "extremely low range" on
the IQ scale. (R. 120/O'Connor report 4/5/05 page 6)
In a competency report dated January 11, 2005, Dr. O'Connor opined that
the defendant was not competent to assist counsel or appreciate the nature and
i

importance of the proceeding against him. (R.120/page 7) She further opined that
at the time of the offense "Mr. Johns likely suffered from intellectual functioning
that was in the Mildly Retarded Range." And "his underlying low IQ and
neuropsychological impairments likely played a bigger role in his behavior [on the
day of the offense] and [this] may have prevented him from forming the required
mental state." (R. 120/ page 8,9)
Defense counsel overlooked all these reports and apparently relied only on
the Utah State Hospital Forensic Unit report that stated that after treatment at the
facility he had become able to proceed on the charges. That report also stated
4
"Previous evaluations have provided the court with information concerning his
likely mental state at the time of the incident events, and this matter is beyond the
scope of this assessment." (R. 120/ pg. 4,5)
The second prong of the two-part test articulated in Strickland is "the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at
687,80 L.Ed. 2d at 693.
In Strickland, the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to
justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." In State v. Templin, 805 P.2d
182 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that to meet the second part of the
Strickland test a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Id. at 187 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In making the determination that counsel was ineffective
the appellate court should "consider the totality of the evidence, taking into
account such factors as whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or
have an isolated effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record."
Id
In the case at bar, the second prong of the Strickland test has clearly been
met. It is undisputed that the defendant has significant mental health and mental
functioning limitations. Those limitations clearly combined, in the opinion of Dr.
O'Connor to render the defendant unable to form the requisite mental intent at the
time of the offense. Absent defense counsel's failure to raise this issue at the time
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of sentencing constituted failure clearly within the insufficiency level contemplated
in Strickland and its progeny.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN
FAILING TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT RULING TO THE
EFFECT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS INCOMPETENT
AT THE TIME HE ENTERED HIS PLEA AND THEREFORE
HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS HAD BEEN VIOLATED.

The Defendant is cognizant of the requirement to properly preserve the
issue for appeal. This requirement would generally mandate that defense counsel
raise and argue the issue before the trial court. In the case of State v. Holgate, 10
P.3d 346, 350 (Utah Ct. App. 2000), the Court reaffirmed the requirement that
"claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." In that case
the court held:
The preservation rule serves two important policies. First, "in the
interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it."
(citing State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989).

{

The Defendant recognizes the difficult burden he must overcome in
challenging a conviction where there is a failure of trial counsel to make a proper
objection. However, in the case of State v. Pierce 655 P.2d 676, 677 (Utah 1982)
4
the Supreme Court of Utah recognized a limited exception for review where
manifest injusticeDigitized
allows
review "in rare cases under Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of
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Evidence, or under such exceptions as this Court considers of momentous concern
in protecting constitutional rights previously waived."
This doctrine of manifest injustice was further explained in the case of State
v. Nelson-Waggoner, 94 P.3d 186 (Utah 2004) where the Court held:
Recently, we have applied the exception sparingly, reserving it for
the most unusual circumstances where our failure to consider an
issue that was not properly preserved for appeal would have
resulted in manifest injustice. (Id. at 191)
Further, in the case of State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, (Utah Ct. App. 1996) the Court
stated:
The exceptional circumstances concept serves as a "safety device,"
to assure that "manifest injustice does not result from the failure to
consider an issue on appeal." Unlike "plain error," "exceptional
circumstances" is not so much a precise doctrine, which may be
analyzed in terms of fixed elements, as it is a descriptive term used
to memorialize an appellate court's judgment that even though an
issue was not raised below and even though the plain error doctrine
does not apply, unique procedural circumstances nonetheless permit
consideration of the merits of the issue on appeal. (Id. at page 8
citations omitted)
Finally, in the unpublished opinion1 oi State v. Robison 2005 WL 91251
(Utah App.) (not reported Certiorari granted), this Court made an excellent analysis
of the manifest injustice doctrine in reversing a conviction of a defendant. In that
case this Court held:

1

While defense counsel recognizes the Appellate Court's general reluctance to review unpublished decisions cited
in a brief, analysis of the manifest injustice doctrine in the cited case could not be as clearly and concisely presented
by defense counsel. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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]f 1 We do not necessarily disagree with the dissent's conclusion that
Robison did not adequately present this issue either to the trial court
or to this court. However, to avoid a "great and manifest injustice/'
we will reach this issue sua sponte as an exception to the
preservation rule. State v. Pierce, 655 P.2d 676, 677 (Utah 1982)
(per curiam) (stating that appellate court can reach an issue sua
sponte as an exception to the preservation rule if a "great and
manifest injustice" would otherwise occur); see also State v.
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 923 n. 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citing
Pierce and noting parenthetically that "court can entertain an
exception sua sponte if facts reveal 'great and manifest injustice'
would otherwise occur" (quoting Pierce, 655 P.2d at 677)).

The manifest injustice in the case at bar is the Due Process violation of
taking a plea from a defendant that the trial court knew lacked the capacity and
competency to understand the consequences of that plea. Furthermore, the trial
court was cognizant or should have been cognizant of the fact that the defendant
was probably unable to form the requisite criminal intent at the time the crime
occurred. This Court in the case of State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 675 (Utah App.
1993) held that:
Courts considering alleged violations in the taking of guilty pleas
are "not limited to the record of the plea hearing but may look at the
surrounding facts and circumstances, including the information the
petitioner received from his or her attorneys before entering the
plea." (Quoting Salazar v. Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988(Utah
1993))
Rule 11(e)(3) requires that a pleading defendant "knows of the right to the
presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the
right to a speedyDigitized
public
trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and
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cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the
attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are
waived;" (emphasis added)
Rule 11(e)(4)(A) requires that the defendant "understands the nature and
elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution
would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements;"(emphasis added)
Finally, Rule 11(e)(5) requires that the pleading defendant "knows the
minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory
nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a
plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive
sentences;" (emphasis added).
In the case of Jacobs v. State, 20 P.3d 382, 385 (Utah 2001) the court, in
denying a ten year post conviction habeas corpus petition noted that:
"A mentally incompetent defendant can provide no defense, and
proceedings against such a defendant do not comport with due
process." State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Utah 1989) (citing
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (I960))." In the case of York
v. Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590, 594 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) the Utah Court
of Appeals held: "Due process requires that a defendant be
competent to plead guilty, (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,
172, 95 S.Ct. 896, 904, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975))
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that an individual must be
competent to enter
a guilty plea. In the case of State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309
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(Utah 1987) the Court placed the burden of ensuring a pleading defendants'
competency on the trial court, and thait inquiry into such should be made at the
time a plea in entered. In State v. Gibbons the court stated:
Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring
that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with
when a guilty plea is entered. (Id. at 1312)
This concept is not only mandated by due process requirements, but is
statutory as well UCA §77-15-1 provides that, "[n]o person who is incompetent to
proceed shall be tried for a public offense." In the case at bar, the defendant,
according to the experts that had been employed by the court to analyze the
defendant was mentally retarded as well as under a significant mental disorder at
the time of the occurrence as well as at the time of the entry of plea. The due
process implications of this complex situation should have been clearly evident to
the trial court. The court should have sua sponte refused to sentence the defendant
until those issue had been resolved one way or another.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this court to reverse
his conviction and remand to the trial court for further proceeding.
DATED this _p day of IfebruaW, 2006.

)ALL W. RICHARDS
Attorney for Appellant
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTES
APP SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Afh

vs,
RANDALL KEVIN JOHNS,
Defendant

J 2?i

Case No: 041903027 FS
Judge:
Date:

MICHAEL D. LYON
August 15, 2005

PRESENT
Clerk:
shannone
Reporter: SHINGLE, LAURIE
Prosecutor: BRENDA BEATON
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): MIKE BOUWHUIS, PDA
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: October 1, 1963
Video
CHARGES
1. CHILD KIDNAPPING - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/15/2005 Guilty
HEARING
This is time set for sentencing. The defendant is present in
custody and represented by Mike Bouwhuis.
Defense counsel addresses the Court and requests credit for the
time that the defendant has served and formal probation.
The State requests that a prison commitment be imposed based on
the type of crime.
Based on the four mental evaluations submitted to the court, the
Court is satisfied that the defendant is competent to proceed.
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Case No: 041903027
Date:
Aug 15, 2005
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of CHILD KIDNAPPING a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State
Prison.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Dated t h i s

16day

of

20

Q£

MMJ2

MICHAEL D. LYON
District Court
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11

c
West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
-•RULE 11. PLEAS
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented
by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. T h e defendant shall
not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer
with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of
insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead
or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not
guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set
for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant,
or counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(e) (1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel,
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;

he

or

or

she

has

guilty

and

knowingly

(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e) (3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before
an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses,
and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(e) (4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden
of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is
an admission of all those elements;
(e) (4) (B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if
it establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or,
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. W o r k s .
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11
if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(e) (5) the
the minimum
offense to
consecutive

defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable,
mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may b e imposed for each
which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of
sentences;

(e) (6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(e) (7) the defendant has
withdraw the plea; and

been

advised

of the

time

plea

limits

for

discussion

filing

and

plea

any motion

to

(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if
used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically
required by statute or rule, a court is not required
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.

to

(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a
motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed
to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or
the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by the
court.
(g) (2) If sentencing
advise the defendant
binding on the court.

recommendations are allowed by the
personally that any recommendation

(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.

court,
as to

discussions

the court shall
sentence is not

prior

to

any

plea

(h) (2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request
of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the
reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then
indicate to the prosecuting
attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed
disposition will be approved.
(h)(3)
If the
judge
then
decides
that
final
disposition
should
not be
in
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. W o r k s .
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11

(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may
enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest,
reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the
adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails
on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the
other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(k) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a
whole. Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule
is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea.
[Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November
2001; November 1, 2002; April 1, 2005; November 1, 2005.]

1,

1997; November

1,

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
These amendments are intended to reflect current law without any substantive
changes. The addition of a requirement for a finding of a factual basis in
section (e) (4) (B) tracks federal rule 11(f), and is in accordance with prior case
law. E.g. State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440
(Utah 1983). The rule now
explicitly recognizes pleas under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct.
160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), and sets forth the factual basis required for those
pleas. E.g. Willett v. Barnes, 842 P.2d 860 (Utah 1992).
The amendments explicitly recognize that plea affidavits, where used, may properly
be incorporated into the record when the trial court determines that the defendant
has read (or been read) the affidavit, understands its contents, and acknowledges
the contents. State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216 (Utah 1991). Proper incorporation of
plea affidavits can save the court time, eliminate some of the monotony of rote
recitations of rights waived by pleading guilty, and allow a more focused and
probing inquiry into the facts of the offense, the relationship of the law to
those facts, and whether the plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered. These
benefits are contingent on a careful and considered review of the affidavit by the
defendant and proper care by the trial court to verify that such a review has
actually occurred.
The final paragraph of section (e) clarifies that the trial court may, but need
not, advise defendants concerning collateral consequences of a guilty plea. The
failure to so advise does not affect the validity of a plea. State v. McFadden,
884 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1994), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995).
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES
Owens, The Case Against Plea-Bargaining, 1 Utah B.J. 8 (Nov. 1988).
LIBRARY REFERENCES
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

